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TORT LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYERS WHO
CREATE WORKPLACE CONDITIONS
"SUBSTANTIALLY CERTAIN" TO CAUSE
INJURY OR DEATH
Barbara J. Tucker*
INTRODUCTION

A broken and guardless sawmill planer "literally ripped to pieces"
the left arm of Spring Creek Forest Products employee Randal Noonan
on December 22, 1980.1 The planer amputated three fingers and the
thumb of Noonan's left hand and ripped the skin off his left arm "from
his wrist to his elbow." 2 Employees had requested that the planer, which
had been broken for about a month, be repaired.3 The planer had injured
two other workers on three separate occasions and had lacerated one of
Noonan's fingers previously as well.4 Noonan alleged that his foreman repeatedly worked while intoxicated and was intoxicated on the day of the
injury.5 Moreover, Noonan alleged that Spring Creek knew the foreman
worked while intoxicated, knew the planer was broken, knew the condition of the planer violated OSHA regulations, and knew the planer had
injured other employees, but it had concealed these injuries from
Noonan.' Notwithstanding these facts, the Montana Supreme Court held
that Noonan could not sue Spring Creek in tort.7 The court reasoned that
because the company did not specifically intend to harm Noonan, he
could not bring himself within the "true intentional tort" exception to
Montana's exclusive remedy rule." Workers' compensation, therefore, was
Noonan's exclusive remedy.9 In so holding, Montana placed itself
* I gratefully thank University of Montana Law School professors David Patterson,
Larry Elison, and Steven Bahls as well as workers' compensation attorney Thomas Bulman
of Bulman Law Associates, all of Missoula, Montana, for their kind comments and suggestions regarding this comment.
1. Noonan v. Spring Creek Forest Prods. Inc., 216 Mont. 221, 227-28, 700 P.2d 623,
627 (1985)(Sheehy, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 227, 700 P.2d at 627. (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 223, 700 P.2d at 624.
4. Id. at 227, 700 P.2d at 627. (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 223, 700 P.2d at 624. Noonan alleged these facts in his complaint, a deposition, and an affidavit. Id. at 225, 700 P.2d at 626. The case was appealed from a summary
judgment. Id. at 223, 700 P.2d at 624.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 225-26, 700 P.2d at 625-26. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration in Billings, Montana, responded to a Freedom of Information request as to whether
Noonan and his co-workers' accidents resulted in penalties or inspections by stating: "We
have no record of inspections of these accidents." Letter from David J. DiTommaso, Area
Director U.S. Dept. Labor, OSHA, to Barbara J. Tucker (May 3, 1989) (letter on file at the
MONTANA LAW REVIEW Office).
8. Noonan at 225-26, 700 P.2d at 625-26.
9. Id.
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squarely within the majority of jurisdictions.
In the majority of jurisdictions, regardless of an employer's willful
and wanton disregard for workplace safety, the exclusive remedy rule denies an injured worker access to remedies other than workers' compensation. The reason most often stated for the rule is that allowing tort suits
under these conditions would shatter the fragile balance between worker
and employer rights struck by the workers' compensation system.1"
However, in a growing minority of jurisdictions, when an employer
willfully ignores workplace safety or knowingly exposes an employee to
conditions that will harm or kill the employee, the employer faces tort
liability. Crystallizing the view of the minority, the Michigan Supreme
Court, a leader in this trend, stated, "Prohibiting a civil action in such a
case 'would allow a corporation to "cost-out" an investment decision to
kill workers.' ",'
It remains a constant, though, that in the majority of jurisdictions in
the United States an employer can knowingly expose employees to a toxic
substance or to an unsafe workplace, and, unless that employer does
something more, such as fraudulently concealing workplace hazards,
workers' compensation provides the employee's exclusive remedy. Part I
of this comment gives an overview of workers' compensation law and its
effect on workplace safety. Part II examines the majority rule that an
injured employee can sue an employer in tort only when the employer
commits a "true intentional tort," such as physically assaulting the employee. Part III examines the minority rule, which holds that if an employer knowingly exposes an employee to conditions substantially .certain
to result in employee injury, the employer has committed an intentional
tort and the employee may sue in tort. Part IV examines Montana's
treatment of the exclusive remedy bar, and the conclusion recommends
that Montana adopt the minority rule. 2
I.

THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION SYSTEM AND

OSHA

REGULATION:

ILLUSORY PROMISES OF WORKPLACE SAFETY

A.

Overview of Workers' Compensation

In all fifty states, workers' compensation constitutes an injured employee's exclusive remedy for employer negligence. Workers' compensation creates a trade-off whereby the system gives the injured employee a
10. See, e.g., Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court, 188 Mont. 1, 6-7, 610 P.2d
717, 720 (1980); Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465,
474, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 863, 612 P.2d 948, 953 (1980).
11. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 25, 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 (1986) (quoting Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chem., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608, 617, 433 N.E.2d 572, 579
(1982)) (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring)(emphasis added).
12. For additional discussion of intentional torts as an exception to the exclusive remedy rule, see Comment, The Exclusivity Rule: Dual Capacity and the Reckless Employer,
47 MONT. L. REV. 157 (1986)(authored by John Bohyer).
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"relatively quick, certain, and standardized compensation,"' 3 but bars the
employee from bringing a common-law suit unless an employer commits a
traditional intentional tort, such as physically assaulting an employee.
With this trade-off, the injured employee need not prove employer negligence to recover,' and the employer forgoes the common-law defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule.'"
Workers' compensation provides cash benefits and reimbursement for
medical care to injured employees' through a system of social insurance,
which pays standardized amounts for specific types of injuries. Consumers, however, ultimately bear the cost of employee injuries, because manufacturers incorporate the cost of workers' compensation insurance into
the price of the product.'
B.

Workplace Injuries

A "universally stated goal" of workers' compensation is to encourage
workplace safety. 9 In 1987, however, more than six million work-related
injuries occurred, including 351,000 more injuries and 53,000 more occupational illnesses than in 1986, constituting a five-percent increase over
1986.2" On average, about two million workers are disabled each year in
13. Note, Workers' Compensation:Expanding the Intentional Tort Exception to Include Willful, Wanton, and Reckless Employer Misconduct, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 890,
891 (1983) (authored by Thomas Schroeder).
14.

Id.

15. Id.
16.

1 A.

LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 1.00

(1985).

17. Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.
REV. 206 (1952).
Montana ranks in the bottom half of the states in four major categories of workers'
compensation benefits, according to a March 1989 U.S. Department of Labor report. Montana Work-Comp Benefits Given Low Rating, Billings Gazette, Apr. 5, 1989, at 5-C, col. 1
[hereinafter Montana Work-Comp Benefits]: "Montana ranked from 29th to 46th in four
different benefit categories: maximum benefits for temporary total disability - 33rd; permanent total disability - 31st; permanent partial disability - 46th; and death benefits for
surviving spouses and children -29th."
Montana's AFL-CIO Executive Secretary Jim
Murry said the report "ought to deflate the myth about overly generous benefit payments,"
and "outrageously high premium rates" in Montana. Id. "[lIt's time for the debate to focus
on the real problem: the increasing number of injuries in the workplace," Murry added. Id.
18.

LARSON, supra note 16 at

§ 1.00.

19. Comment, Exclusive Remedy Provisions in the Workers' Compensation System:
Unwarranted Immunity for Employers' Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 31 S.D.L. REV.
157, 162 (1985) (authored by Michael Marlow).
20. See Work Injuries Increase Again: Government Cites 5 Percent Jump in '87, Missoulian, Nov. 16, 1988, at 7, col. 6. [hereinafter Work Injuries].
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the United States and another 12,000 die from work-related injuries.2
Thus, the workers' compensation system has fallen short of its goal of
workplace safety2 2 when the "actual rate of injury, death, and disease is
at an all time high.

23

While some government experts attribute the reported increases in
injuries and occupational illnesses to better record-keeping, ' others, such
BUREAU

OF LABOR STATISTICS,

U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, NEWS 5, Table 3 (Dec. 19, 1988):

Table 3. Occupational injury and illness incidence rates per 100 full-time workers, 197387
Injuries and Illnesses
Year

1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

Total
cases

Lost
workday
cases

Nonfatal
cases
without
lost
workdays

Lost
workdays

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

News at 5, Table 3.
While the Bureau of Labor Statistics has "the best available" data, it still "greatly understate[s] accident and illness rates .... " Simison, Safety Last-Job Deaths and Injuries
Seem to Be Increasing After Years of Decline: Cost Cutting and Less Stress on Safe Practices Explain Higher Rate of Accidents: Does One Year Make a Trend? Wall St. J., Mar.
18, 1986, at 1, 25, col. 6, 1 [hereinafter Simison]. Workplace "fatalities in 1984 rose 21%
from 1983, to 3,740, and injuries, 13% to 5.3 million." Id. at 1, col. 6.
21. Comment, supra note 19, at 162 & n.50 (quoting T. DZIELAK AND L. GREINER, INJURED AT WORK (1985)).

22. See Note, Workers' Compensation - Intentional Injury Exception to the Exclusive Remedy Provision - An Employer's Intentional Failure to Maintain a Safe Work
Place Is Not an Intentional Act Unless the Employer Is Substantially Certain That Such
Conduct Would Cause the Injury, 17 ST. MARY'S L.J. 513, 523 (1986) (authored by David
Goldberg).
23. Comment, supra note 19, at 162 & n.50 (quoting T. DZIELAK AND L. GREINER, INJURED AT WORK (1985)).
24. Work Injuries, supra note 20, at 7, col. 6 (reporting comments of OSHA and Bureau of Labor Statistics directors).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/9
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as the AFL-CIO, attribute the increase to OSHA's failure to enforce
safety standards and regulations.2 Eula Bingham, former OSHA Director
under the Carter administration and now a professor of environmental
health at the University of Cincinnati, explains that the 1984 increases
came "three years after the Reagan administration started cutting health
and safety enforcement and five years after employers slashed health and
safety spending."26
Testimony before the U.S. Senate indicated that in its first two years
in office "the Reagan Administration radically altered OSHA enforcement
policies [by] limiting the number of employers subject to OSHA inspec27
tions and reducing citations and penalties for violations of the law.
These changes largely exempted the majority of employers-as many as
eighty-six percent in manufacturing-from routine OSHA safety
inspections. 8
The Reagan administration also changed policies regarding complaint inspections in 1982, directing area offices "not to conduct inspections" if workers complained about less than "serious hazards."2 9 According to Senate testimony:
From .. .1980 to .. .1983, the number of workplace inspections con-

ducted by the agency declined by 8,000 and the number of workers covered by inspections fell from 3.7 million to 2 million. The number of serious citations issued fell by 41 percent, and the number of [detected]
willful violations by 91 percent. Total penalties proposed for violations
fell from $25.5 million to $5.6 million, a drop of 78 percent ....11
The evidence shows that as a "direct result" of these administrative poli25.

Id.

26. Simison, supra note 20 at 25, col. 1.
27. On Oversight of the Occupational Safety and Health Act: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 14 (1988) (state-

ment of Lynn Williams, President of the United Steelworkers of America and Vice President of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations) [hereinafter Williams]. The Reagan administration also curtailed standard-setting activities that
were underway on well-documented cancer-causing agents such as cadmium, chromates,
nickel, and asbestos. Id. at 4.
28. Id. at 15. Williams testified that:
Routine inspections were scheduled only in manufacturing, construction, maritime
and a few other industries selected for special emphasis programs. Workplaces in
all other sectors (e.g., service, transportation, utilities, telecommunications, etc.)
were not scheduled for any routine safety inspections.
Within the manufacturing sector, all industries with a lost workday injury
rate less than the private sector national average were automatically exempt from
routine safety inspections. For industries still covered, firms were exempted if
their individual injury records demonstrated a low lost workday injury rate. The
net result of this policy was to exempt 86 percent of all manufacturing employers from routine safety inspections.

Id. (emphasis added).
29.

Id.

30. Id. at 16.
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cies, OSHA enforcement "plummeted."'- While no direct evidence exists
to link a decrease in safety enforcement with an increase in injury rates,
the circumstantial link between the two is apparent.
The recession of the early 1980s also contributed to deterioration in
workplace safety. A tight economy prompted employers to "reduce []
sharply" health and safety budgets and, instead, to "stress .

.

. competi-

tiveness, often at the expense of safety," resulting in increased death and
injury rates. 2
In addition to the human tragedy, workplace accidents are expensive.
The National Safety Council estimates that in 1984, such accidents
drained national productivity of "$33 billion in lost wages, medical expenses, property damage and indirect costs . . . -33 In 1985, each time
an American worker sustained a disabling injury in the workplace, that
injury cost an employer $18,650, an increase of more than seven percent
from 1984.

3

1

OSHA civil penalties and criminal provisions are woefully inadequate
to induce employer compliance with safety regulations. Despite the high
costs to industry that accidents impose, those costs, even combined with
31. Id.
32. Simison, supra note 20, at 1, col. 6. Noting that the injury rate for oil and gas
extractions "shot up 22% in 1984, more than for any other industrial category," Simison
reported that safety "appear[s] to have deteriorated most in construction, manufacturing,
and oil and gas extraction." Id. at 25, col. 1. For example, a Wyoming oil company drilled at
night to save money even though state safety regulations prohibited the practice. Id. at 1,
col. 6. The lights needed for nighttime drilling increase the risk of explosions and "[jiust
such an explosion" killed one man and injured four others. Id. Only a month after this
accident, another rig worker for the same company was killed when a drilling pipe crushed
him, because workers rushed the job. Id. Cutting costs by terminating safety engineers by
reductions in force, and by hiring inexperienced hands "apparently contributed" to another
Wyoming rig worker's death in February 1985. Id. at 25, col. 1.
Inadequate training and maintenance also caused a chemical leak at a Kerr-McGee Corporation uranium-reprocessing plant. The leak killed one worker and injured 32 others. Id.
"[lImproper inspection and maintenance" may have caused the July 23, 1984, Unocal Corp.
refinery explosion at Lemont, Illinois, which killed 17 and injured 17 others. Id. OSHA proposed only $31,000 in fines for the incident. Id.
OSHA officials contended that "discontin[uance of] safety training and safety maintenance" caused the deaths of two St. Joe Resources Co. employees who died of carbon-monoxide poisoning in Monaca, Pennsylvania, and yet proposed fines of only $20,000 in that
incident. Id.
Two McDonnell Douglas Corp. pipe fitters died October 3, 1985, in St. Louis from
chemical burns when they attempted to maintain "productivity at the expense of
safety ....
" Id. OSHA proposed fines of $44,300 for alleged violations contributing to
these deaths. Id.
Barrie Lighting Co. of Newark, Ohio, paid only $1,320 for twelve OSHA violations, nine
of which related to an accident in which a nineteen-year-old woman lost seven fingers. Fines
Follow Accident That Severed 7 Fingers, Columbus Dispatch, Apr. 12, 1989, at 5E, col. 1.
33. Simison, supra note 20 at 1, col. 6.
34. Labor Letter: A Disabling Injury, Wall St. J., Apr. 14, 1987, at 1, col. 5. The Du
Pont Co. estimated that a company with 1,000 employees "would need $11.3 million... [in]
sales to offset . . . [injury] cost[s]." Id.

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/9
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"out-of-date" 3" OSHA penalties, do not in many instances outweigh the
benefits of noncompliance. A maximum OSHA fine of $1,000 for serious
hazards, for example, "provides little incentive for compliance."3 6 Even
where OSHA has fined major corporations, such as General Dynamics,
Chrysler and IBP, a large meatpacker, $500,000 or more37 for multiple
safety violations,38 these fines have failed to inspire safer workplaces
nationwide.
This failure is largely because OSHA subjects an employer to criminal sanctions only when a standards violation results in an employee's
death, when an employer falsifies records, or when an employer uses advance notice to avoid an inspection or to cover up unsafe conditions.3 9
Criminal provisions do not apply, for example, to cases where employees
"are maimed or poisoned" through intentional violations of OSHA standards but no worker dies."° Thus, with the severe curtailment of inspections, infrequency of large fines, and the unlikelihood of criminal prosecution for even the most egregious safety violations, an employer
frequently
41
has little to fear under the current OSHA penalty system.
The Reagan administration also slashed OSHA's budget. For exam35. Williams, supra note 27, at 25. Currently, "[elvery other safety and health and
environmental law has stronger penalties and criminal provisions." Id.
36. Id.
37. Risky Proposition, Wall St. J., Aug. 17, 1987, at 20, col. 1.
38. OSHA has levied some very large fines. For example, Chrysler Corporation agreed
to pay $1.6 million for overexposing workers to lead and arsenic and for other alleged health
and safety violations. Chrysler Agrees to Pay $1.6 Million Fine to Settle OSHA Health,
Safety Charges, Wall St. J., July 7, 1987, at 3, col. 2.
Scott Paper paid $475,000 for 121 alleged job safety and "203 [alleged] willful recordkeeping violations." Scott Paper Co. to Pay $475,00 in Settling Case, Wall St. J., Dec. 7,
1987, at 15, col. 3.
IBP Corp., the nation's second largest meatpacker, agreed to pay "a reduced penalty of
$975,000 to settle record total fines assessed against a single employer" for deliberately concealing worker injuries and illness at its Dakota City, Nebraska, plant. IBP to Pay $975,000
to Settle Charges on Safety, Sources Say, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1988, at C 13, col. 2.
OSHA has proposed a new record $4.3 million fine against United Brands' John Morrell
& Co. plant in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, for "willfully ignoring" cumulative-trauma injuries to workers. OSHA Urges Record Penalty For Meatpacker: United Brands' Morrell
Unit Faces $4.3 Million Fine Over Safety Violations, Wall St. J., Oct. 31, 1988, at A4, col. 1.
For 1988, the Morrell plant's injury rate was "41.7 per 100 full-time workers, or nine times
the annual industry average, OSHA said." Id. (emphasis added). "The company knew of the
problem as early as 1984 but did little to correct it, the agency said." Id. OSHA added that
"[flully 880 of 2,000 employees at the Morrell plant sustained serious and sometimes disabling cumulative-trauma injuries between May 1987 and April 1988 ....
" Id.
OSHA proposed $1.6 million in fines against East Helena's Asarco Inc.'s lead smelter
for "202 'egregious willful' violations, including exposing workers to lead and arsenic at
levels 'far in excess' of permitted levels ....
" U.S. Cites Asarco and Asks Fines of $1.6
Million, Wall St. J., Apr. 20, 1988, at 32, col. 4. An OSHA deputy assistant secretary stated,
"This plant has consistently ignored basic safety and health protection for its workers ....
Id.
39. Williams, supra note 27, at 25.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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ple, Reagan's proposed 1982 OSHA budget was $195.5 million,42 while
President Carter's proposed budget was $242.6 million, $47.1 million
more than Reagan's 1982 and $7.1 million more than Reagan's 1988
budget of $235.5 million.4 s The Reagan administration also cut budgets
for other related agencies, such as the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health, the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of
Toxic Substances, and the National Cancer Institute."" As Lynn Williams,
President of the United Steelworkers of America correctly stated, "The
net result [of the budget cuts] is a diminished role for the federal government and reduced activity in workplace protection efforts ...

at a time

when.., growing concerns and growing demands for action on safety and
health matters [exist].

'46

In Montana, a worker currently faces not only a workplace constrained by a tight economy and endangered by weakened OSHA enforcement, but also a new, more restrictive definition of injury under workers'
compensation. 46 The new definition makes it more difficult for the injured
worker to receive workers' compensation. 47 Finally, the Montana worker
faces the exclusive remedy rule, which bars an action in tort unless the
employer's conduct fits Montana's "true intentional tort" exception.
C. The Role of the Exclusive Remedy Rule
In the majority of jurisdictions, the exclusive remedy rule insulates
an employer from a tort action unless he or she "intentionally" harms an
employee .4 s An Arizona case graphically illustrates the causal link be42. Williams, supra note 27, at Table 8.
43. Id. According to testimony, these reduced agency budgets also resulted in salaries
that are "much lower than comparable jobs in the private sector," having a starting pay
range from $15,118 to $18,726. Id. at 28. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment reported that by 1985, OSHA had only 1,089 inspectors, a cut of 16% from its 1979 levels, and
noted as early as 1985 that the agency's regulatory effort was "already weak." Simison,
supra note 20, at 25, col. 2.
44. Williams, supra note 27, at 28.
45. Id. at 28-29.
46. Many of Montana's employers do not qualify for OSHA inspection because of their
"small business" status. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-119 (1987) redefines injury so that only
those injuries "caused by a specific event on a single day or during a single work shift" are
covered. Id. at (2)(d). The new definition specifically excludes "emotional or mental stress..
•, cardiovascular, pulmonary, respiratory, or other disease[s]." Id. at (3)(a), (5). See also
Comment, The Definition of Injury Under the Workers' Compensation Act: Revisited and
Redefined, 49 MONT.L. REV. 341 (1988)(authored by Kraig Kazda).
47. See Trieweiler, The New Workers' Compensation Act-Something For All
Montanans to be Ashamed of, 50 MONT. L. REV. 83 (1989).
48. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-411, 413 (1987). Similar to other states' exclusive
remedy provisions, Montana's provides:
[A]n employer is not subject to any liability whatever for the death of or personal
injury to an employee covered by the Workers' Compensation Act .... The
Workers' Compensation Act binds the employee... and in the case of death binds
[the employee's] personal representative and all persons having any right or claim
to compensation for [the employee's] injury or death ....

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/9
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tween safety violations and worker safety and further shows the tragedy
of the exclusive remedy rule. In Serna v. Statewide Contractors,Inc., 9 a
twenty-five-foot-deep ditch collapsed, buried, and killed two workers.50
The trench had caved in previously, burying one employee "to his
waist."51 On at least thirteen separate occasions over a five-month period
prior to the deaths, Arizona safety inspectors had warned the contractor
that it had not adequately trenched the slopes and had recommended
providing escape ladders inside the trench.2 Instead of remedying the
safety problems, the contractor told the men to "crawl inside the sewer
pipe" they were laying and wait to be dug out if a cave-in occurred.5 3 The
ditch did collapse, and workers did run for the sewer pipe, but were buried before they could reach it." While the Arizona Court of Appeals
stated it had "no difficulty" in finding that the deadly cave-in was the
"direct result" of Statewide's refusal to follow the safety inspector's recommendations,55 the court nevertheless held that Statewide's willful and
wanton misconduct was not specifically directed at the two men.56 Thus,
Mont. Code Ann. § 39-71-411 (1987).
Exceptions to Montana's exclusive-remedy rule include torts committed by a third
party (MONT.CODE

ANN.

§

39-71-412 (1987) and intentional torts (MONT.CODE

ANN.

§

39-71-

413 (1987)).
49. 6 Ariz. App. 12, 429 P.2d 504 (1967).
50. Id. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505. According to a National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health study, excavation cave-ins cause nearly one percent of all work-related
deaths annually. Labor Letter-A Special News Report on People and Their Jobs in Offices, Fields and Factories:Excavation Cave-Ins, Wall St. J., Mar. 4, 1986, at 1, col. 5. The
study reports that such accidents may occur because employers misinterpret OSHA rules.
Id.
After a "rash of trench cave-ins killed 42 workers" in 1985, OSHA "step[ped] up efforts
to inspect trenches." Simison, supra note 20, at 25, col. 4. In one instance, OSHA cited a
Colorado company for failing to provide any shoring in a 34-foot-deep trench, which collapsed and killed four workers. The company "contest[ed] the [$50,000] civil citation, [and]
maintain[ed] that, within cost limits, it tried to dig a trench that wouldn't cave in. The
company assert[ed] that there aren't any generally accepted safety standards for digging
trenches and that OSHA's own rules are inadequate, a point that OSHA concede[d]." Id. at
25, col. 5.
51. Serna, 6 Ariz. App. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505.
52. Id. at 14, 429 P.2d at 506.
53. Id. at 13, 429 P.2d at 505.
54. Id. at 13-14, 429 P.2d at 505-06.
55. Id. at 14, 429 P.2d at 506.
56. Id. at 16, 429 P.2d at 508. In Adsem v. Roske, Mont. -, 728 P.2d 1352 (1986),
a case similar to Serna, the widow of Richard Adsem, who was killed in a trench cave-in,
also contended that defendant Roske and Grover, Inc. committed an intentional tort in subjecting Adsem to conditions substantially certain to result in his death. Id. at -, 728 P.2d
at 1353. Decedent Adsem "was installing pipe in a trench 11-12 feet deep with no sloping or
shoring of the walls when the walls of the trench collapsed and Adsem suffocated." Id. In
her complaint, Delores Adsem "maintain[edl that the employer knew the trench was unsafe,
and that a cave-in was likely and yet ordered . . .[her husband] into the trench, which
collapsed on him." Id. The court rejected the widow's contentions and instead held that
these facts constituted "at most, gross negligence" and not an intentional tort. Id. at -'
728 P.2d 1354.
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the employers remained immune from a tort suit.5 7
II.

THE MAJORITY RULE:

A

SUBJECTIVE TEST FOR EMPLOYER INTENT

A. The Rule
Courts following the majority rule hold that "failure to provide a safe
workplace" does not constitute an intentional tort.58 Instead, the majority
of courts, Montana's included, limits an employee's recovery to cases in
which the employer commits a "true intentional tort, 59 that is, when the
employer "truly intended the injury as well as the act." 0 The Montana
57. In a case similar to Serna, a 17-foot wall of a trench collapsed burying and killing
two 25-year-old workers in Annandale, Virginia. Va. Jury Probes Building Firms' Safety
Practice,Wash. Post, Feb. 2, 1980, C2, col. 1. Although substantial testimony indicated their
employer blatantly violated safety regulations, because the two workers were single and left
no dependents, the sole liability of the employer for their deaths amounted to a $1,000
allowance for each employee's burial expenses. Id. If deaths occurred in Montana under
similar circumstances, workers' compensation would pay $1,400 for burial expenses. MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-71-725 (1987).
Hazardous occupations, such as logging, construction, and oil-field work, frequently employ young, single men. In at least one case, Barnes v. Double Seal Glass Co., 129 Mich.
App. 66, 341 N.W.2d 812 (1983), parents of a 16-year-old boy, who was working illegally,
alleged that by consciously withholding emergency medical care, the employer allowed their
son to die. As a result, the employer merely paid death benefits and avoided paying disability payments over the rest of the boy's life. Id. at 69-70, 341 N.W.2d at 814.
In Barnes, a foreman ordered three employees to load a cart with glass and move it to
another area. Although the cart could only withstand 500 pounds, the workers overloaded
the cart so one side weighed 2,460 pounds. Id. at 69, 341 N.W.2d at 814. When they attempted to push the cart, a wheel shattered and the entire load of glass fell on Tim Barnes.
"The glass sheared off part of decedent's skull, crushed his skull and tore major arteries."
Id. Instead of calling for emergency medical aid, which was only four minutes away, Barnes'
foreman went "into his office for 10 to 20 minutes to compose himself, leaving decedent
bleeding under the shattered glass." Id. The Double Seal employees finally drove Barnes to
the hospital in the back of an open pick-up truck but told hospital personnel that they had
found him by the side of the road. Id. at 69-70, 341 N.W.2d at 814. After leaving the hospital the employees "cleaned up the accident site so that police would not be able to accurately investigate the accident." Id. Barnes' parents later contended that the foremen and
the other employees "conspired to let decedent die because they knew that worker's compensation death benefits were radically lower than payment of disability benefits .
Id.
at 66, 341 N.W.2d at 812.
58. Courts following the majority rule generally hold, as in Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin,
689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985), that "failure to provide a safe workplace does not constitute an
intentional injury in order for the claimant to escape" the exclusive remedy of workers'
compensation. Id. at 406
In Reed, plaintiff Copelin alleged that Reed Tool "intentionally caused her husband's..
[severe head injury, which left him brain damaged and in a coma] by intentionally requiring him to work a machine that Reed Tool knew was unsafe, did not meet minimal safety
standards, and was defective because of a modification" Reed made. Id. at 405. Copelin also
alleged that "Reed Tool knew her husband was inadequately trained and ... required him
to work 'such long hours as violated minimum requirements of law.'" These allegations
were insufficient in Texas to overcome the exclusive remedy bar. Id.
59. See Noonan, supra note 8.
60. Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 427 Mich. 1, 19, 398 N.W.2d 882, 891 (1986) (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court described this standard in Great Western Sugar Co. v.
District Court,6 1 in which the plaintiff alleged Great Western's unsafe
workplace caused him to suffer permanent foot damage. In that case, the
court ruled that the only way for an employee to overcome the exclusive
remedy bar is to show that the employer "maliciously and specifically
directed [harm] at an employee, or class of employee out of which such
specific intentional harm the employee receives injuries as a proximate
result." 2 In the "true intentional tort" jurisdictions, then, the only time
an employee may maintain an action in tort is when the employer engages in a so-called "true intentional tort," such as fraudulent concealment 3 or an assault or battery. In these jurisdictions, then, employer in61. 188 Mont. 1, 7, 610 P.2d 717, 720 (1980).
62. Id. at 7, 610 P.2d at 720 (emphasis added). In Johns-Manville Prod. Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980), the California Supreme Court articulated the majority of jurisdiction's fear that allowing a tort suit
for injuries substantially certain to occur would jeopardize the workers' compensation system. Although even the Johns-Manville majority acknowledged that a tortious employer's
"conduct may be characterized as intentional or even deceitful," the majority nonetheless
stated that:
if an action at law were allowed as a remedy, many cases cognizable under workers' compensation would also be prosecuted outside that system. The focus of the
inquiry in a case involving work-related injury would often be not whether the
injury arose out of and in the course of employment, but the state of knowledge of
the employer and the employee regarding the dangerous condition which caused
the injury. Such a result would undermine the underlying premise upon which the
workers' compensation system is based.
Id. at 474, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 863, 612 P.2d at 953. (See also Stalnaker v. Boeing Co., 186
Cal.App.3d 1291, 1299, 231 Cal.Rptr. 323, 327 (1986).
63. In Johnson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 642 F. Supp. 1102, 1105 (D. Mont. 1986), a federal case applying Montana law, the court held an employer liable for causing a "second
injury" in fraudulently concealing the harm W.R. Grace employees had sustained from exposure to asbestos when the employee failed to disclose the results of company-required
physical examinations and chest x-rays. Id. at 1106.
Similarly, in Johns-Manville, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948, the court
held that Johns-Manville's initial decision to expose workers to asbestos, though it was
aware of its dangers, did not constitute an intentional tort. The company physicians' decision fraudulently to conceal the cause of an employee's illnesses from him, however, constitute an "aggravation" of the employees' diseases and an intentional tort. Id. at 478, 165 Cal.
Rptr. at 866, 612 P.2d at 956.
"More than 100,000 workers have died" from exposure to asbestos, and the tragedy of
the past few decades is repeating itself. Dahl, Bad Riddance: Ripping Out Asbestos Endangers More Lives as Laws Are Ignored; The Insulating Material Killed Thousands of Installers; Poor Removal Is as Risky; Of Space Suits and Bandannas, Wall St. J., Mar. 5,
1986, at 1, col. 6. While the asbestos exposures from decades ago occurred while using asbestos in the construction of buildings, exposures now occur during removal. Id. Correct removal of asbestos requires that employees wear space-suit-like gear and masks to reduce
exposure. Id. However, the Environmental Protection Agency has observed workers sweeping asbestos debris with brooms, as if they were cleaning up a garage. Id. In an incident in
Salem, Massachusetts, a company hired eight teenagers to remove asbestos from an abandoned school. "[Yanking out asbestos with their bare hands .... " the teen-agers asked an
EPA inspector, "Is this bad?" Id. A contractor who hired workers off the street to remove
asbestos from a hotel in San Antonio, Texas, did not tell them they were removing it. Id. at
29, col. 3. "Most say they wore bandannas over their mouths, or nothing at all, to protect
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tent is measured subjectively.
Requiring just such a standard, the Montana Supreme Court recognized this very "narrow exception" to the exclusive remedy rule in
Sitzman v. Schumaker." In that case, employer-rancher Jake Schumaker
struck ranch laborer James Sitzman on the back of the head with a pipe,
causing a skull fracture and other severe injuries.6 5 Holding that Schumaker had committed an intentional tort, the court stated: "To allow an
employer ...

personally [to] commit an assault and battery upon an em-

ployee and hide behind the exclusivity clause of the Workers' Compensation Act is to disregard the purpose of the Act." 6
The Montana court's "true intentional tort" rule, however, allows
employers to do the same thing-to shield other kinds of intentional
wrongdoing behind the exclusive remedy rule. For example, the egregiousness of the employer's conduct in Noonan could have prompted the
Montana Supreme Court to adopt the minority's "substantial certainty"
test for intent. Under this test, Noonan could have sued Spring Creek in
tort because his injury was substantially certain to occur. Spring Creek
allegedly knew its supervisor worked while intoxicated, knew it was in
violation of federal safety regulations, and knew that the planer previously had injured other employees, as well as Noonan, in the same way
that it had injured Noonan when it mangled part of his hand.6 7 Nonetheless, in a four-to-three decision, the Montana Supreme Court reaffirmed
Great Western's "true intentional tort" standard. To avoid the exclusive remedy bar, according to the majority, Noonan would have had to
prove that Spring Creek egregiously violated safety regulations with the
specific, indeed subjective, intent of injuring him, 6 an inordinately high
themselves from the dust." Id. at 29, cols. 3-4.
"Federal and state agencies cited more than 1,300 asbestos violations last year, and a
government survey shows that at least 25% of removals are fouled up." Id. at 1, col. 6.
While no one knows how many dangerous removals are occurring, OSHA "found violations
in 219 of 806 removal jobs that it inspected" in 1985. Id. at 29, col. 1. In addition, "asbestos
regulations are flawed." Id. at 29, col. 4. OSHA estimates "that even if its standards were
followed to the letter, 64 of every 1,000 workers who remove asbestos would still eventually
die from overexposure." Id. at 29, cols. 3-4. Moreover, in 1986, OSHA revised asbestos standards for the construction industry so that "short-term work" became exempt "from the
full provisions of the standard ....
" Williams, supra note 26, at 19. OSHA does not define
"short-term work," however. Id. Some construction workers, like sheet-metal workers, "are
exposed to asbestos in short-term operations, but on a regular basis." Id. However, according to Senate testimony, when workers such as these complain about asbestos exposure,
OSHA either fails to inspect the worksite or "inspections generally are not scheduled or
conducted until after the asbestos work is done." Id.
64. Mont..,
-, 718 P.2d 657, 659 (1986)(citing Noonan, 216 Mont. at 224, 700
P.2d at 625, and Great Western, 188 Mont. at 7, 610 P.2d at 720).
65. Id. at -,
718 P.2d at 658.
66. Id. at -' 718 P.2d at 659.
67. Noonan, 216 Mont. at 223, 700 P.2d at 624.
68. Id. at 225-26, 700 P.2d at 625-26.
69. Id. at 225, 700 P.2d at 625. Practitioners should note, however, that part of the
reason for the court's holding may have been the "inartful" drafting of Noonan's complaint.
Id. at 232, 700 P.2d at 630 (Hunt, J., dissenting). Noonan alleged that Spring Creek was
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standard of proof.
B.

Civil and Criminal Intent Standards

Illinois v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc.," although a criminal case,
illustrates an employee's difficult burden in maintaining a civil action
under the "true intentional tort" standard regardless of the egregiousness
of the employer's conduct. Film Recovery Systems operated a plant that
recovered silver from used x-ray film. 71 Workers cut the film into pieces
and then put the pieces into vats of sodium cyanide and water to recover
the silver.7 ' The employer knew that the vats emitted lethal cyanide gas
in the inadequately ventilated work space.71 Chemical labels contained
lengthy warnings in English about the dangers of cyanide.7 To circumvent these warnings, Film Recovery Systems hired employees who could
neither speak nor read English.7 5 Moreover, despite the employees' daily
complaints about the fumes and an inspector's warning in 1981 that the
operation had overgrown the plant, the employer's only response was to
move the executive offices away from exposure to the fumes and to triple
the size of the in-plant operations .7 As a result of these conditions, exposure to77 cyanide poisoned and killed one worker and seriously injured
others.
Illinois prosecutors criminally convicted Film Recovery Systems' corporate officers of involuntary manslaughter.7 8 It is doubtful, however,
grossly negligent. Had he described the defendant's conduct as willful, intentional, and
"substantially certain" to cause his injury, the court might have been willing to apply the
minority test of intent.

By contrast, in a recent case arising in federal district court, the plaintiff alleged that
her immediate supervisor "engaged in a series of intentional acts which were specifically and
maliciously directed towards her and which ultimately resulted in her mental breakdown
and the resultant loss of her job." Oedewaldt v. J.C. Penney Co., 687 F. Supp. 517, 519 (D.
Mont. 1988). The federal court held that if the plaintiff proved her allegations, the defendant's actions would rise to the level of an intentional tort and exclusivity would not bar a
tort suit under Montana law. Id. at 519.
70. Nos. 84 C 5064 and 83 C 11091 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill., June 14, 1985). See
discussion of Film Recovery Systems case in Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 23-25, 398 N.W.2d at
892-93.
71. See Magnuson & Leviton, Policy Considerationsin Corporate Criminal Prosecutions After People v. Film Recovery Systems, Inc. 62, NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1987)
[hereinafter Magnuson & Leviton] for a readily accessible summary of the case.
72. Id. at 913-14.
73. Facts discussed in Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 23, 398 N.W.2d at 892.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 23-24, 398 N.W.2d at 892-93.
77. Id. at 24, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
78. Id. See also Magnuson & Leviton, supra note 71, at 915. The Illinois Criminal
Code defines homicide differently from the Montana Criminal Code. The Illinois Code
states:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:
(1) He either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another;
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whether even this employer's outrageous conduct met the majority of jurisdictions' "true intentional tort" standard, 9 for Film Recovery Systems
did not subjectively intend to poison and kill its workers.8 0 However, because Film Recovery Systems knew with a substantial certainty that its
workplace conditions would injure or kill its workers, it met the objective
standard for intent for criminal liability.8 Thus, while Film Recovery
Systems could escape tort liability for its actions, the court could nonetheless hold its corporate officers criminally liable.
Under the majority rule, then, the standard of proof for intentional
conduct is lower for criminal than for civil liability. Montana's statutory
"purposely" standard for criminal law82 is much less exacting than is the
supreme court's intentional tort standard for workers' compensation law.
The "purposely" standard8 3 in criminal law-Montana's highest for intent-is an objective standard permitting the inference of intent from the
evidence. The "true intentional tort" standard for workers' compensation
requires more difficult proof, however, because under the majority of jurisdictions' application of the standard, workers must prove their employers' subjective intent. Evidence that an employer pursued profit above
worker safety knowing with substantial certainty that injury to a class of
workers would occur should, even in "true intentional tort" jurisdictions,
or
(2) He knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily
harm to that individual or another....
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (emphasis added). Nonetheless,
the Illinois definitions are substantially analogous to Montana's definitions for "purposely"
and "knowingly" intended homicide. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-5-102(a), 45-2-101(33),
(58) (1987).
79. Note the Beauchamp court's critique of "true intentional tort." Beauchamp, 427
Mich. at 19-25, 398 N.W.2d at 891-93.
80. Id. at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 893.
81. Id. at 24, 398 N.W.2d at 893. See also Magnuson & Leviton, supra note 71 at 915.
Under the Montana Criminal Code a person who "purposely or knowingly" commits an act
that will cause the injury or death of another may be found guilty of: 1) deliberate homicide
under MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (1987); 2) mitigated deliberate homicide under MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (1987); 3) assault under MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-201 (1987); or 4)
aggravated assault under MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-202 (1987).
82. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(58) (1987).
83. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-2-101(58)(1987), which defines "purposely" as a "conscious object to engage in that conduct or to cause that result."
Moreover, under criminal law, the state could prove that a defendant employer acted
with knowledge, meeting the "knowingly" standard, a lower standard of intent than either
the criminal purposely or the workers' compensation true intent standard. MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 45-2-101(33)(1987). The "knowingly" standard divides further into two categories of intent, that of substantial certainty, when the actor knows a result is virtually certain to occur, and that of high probability, when the actor knows a high risk of harm exists. Id. The
Montana criminal code defines "knowingly" as conduct that has a high probability of harm.
For example, the Montana Criminal Code states: "A person acts knowingly ... when he [or
she] is aware that it is highly probable" that his or her conduct will cause the harm defined
in a criminal offense. Id. Thus, Montana's criminal "knowingly" standard is still lower than
is the substantial certainty workers' compensation standard adopted in so-called "liberal"
minority jurisdictions.
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compel the inference that the employer intended the injury. By refusing
to draw such inferences of intent only in employment cases, "true intentional tort" jurisdictions, such as Montana's deny workers the remedies
they otherwise could obtain under intentional tort analyses. The anomalous result is that workers in majority jurisdictions can prove an employer
is criminally liable far more readily than they can prove the employer
liable merely in tort.
It is tragically ironic that the majority of courts can recognize an employer's intent to harm when he or she punches a worker in the nose, an
act that will not kill the employee, but cannot see that intent to harm
when an employer deliberately exposes a worker to a chemical that the
employer knows with one-hundred-percent certainty will harm or kill
workers. The employer obviously is subjecting the worker to a form of
violence. The criminal law recognizes intent to harm without regard to
the method by which that harm is effected: fist, gun, or rock. The same
should hold true when an employer tortiously and willfully exposes an
employee to a defective machine or toxic substance, which the employer
knows will injure or harm the employee, and the employee seeks to sue
for an intentional tort. The choice of instrumentality should make no difference in the analysis.
III.

THE MINORITY RULE: CRAFTING AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR
EMPLOYER INTENT
8

West Virginia, " Ohio, and Michigan have all recognized the difficulty
of proving an employer's specific and subjective intent to injure an employee. These courts have, therefore, approached this "rigid definition of
intentional misconduct" 5 by creating the "substantial certainty" test for
inferring intent. Thus, the minority rule infers the requisite tortious intent when an employer knowingly creates conditions "substantially certain" to result in employee injury, illness, or death."
Most of the courts using the minority rule have adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of intent87 to assist in the application
84. Mandolidis v. Elkins Industries, Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907, 921 (W. Va.1978). In
Mandolidis, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that when an employer's
"wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct" results in an employee's death or injury, such conduct translates into "deliberate intention." Id. at 914 The West Virginia Legislature subsequently narrowed the rule of Mandolidis by statute. See W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1983). For
an examination of the West Virginia statute, see Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 620 F.
Supp. 428, 434 (S.D. W. Va. 1985), aff'd, 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1986).
The transposition of negligence terms into the language of intentional tort has produced a less than satisfactory analysis. The "substantial certainty" rule later developed in
Ohio and Michigan offers a clearer analytic approach to employer conduct.
85. Note, supra note 22, at 519.
86. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. App. at 21-22, 398 N.W.2d at 891-92.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, comment b (1965). The Michigan Supreme Court adopted this standard in Beauchamp. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. App. at 25, 398
N.W.2d at 893. SEE also, Prosser & Keeton, LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 35 (5th ed. 1984).
In Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St. 3d 190, 191, 532 N.E.2d 753, 755 (1988),
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of this more objective standard:
"If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially
certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the
law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result."" It does not matter whether the employer wishes the injury would not occur or does not
care whether it occurs. If the injury is substantially certain to occur as a
consequence of actions the employer intended, the employer is deemed
to have intended the injuries as well [as the result] . 9
Adopting this "substantial certainty" standard in Beauchamp,9 0 the
Michigan Supreme Court allowed plaintiff Ronald Beauchamp to sue in
tort for the damage he sustained because of his exposure " to agent orange, while an employee of Dow Chemical Company. 2 Beauchamp's complaint alleged that he had been "physically and mentally affected" by the
exposure.9 3 Framing his complaint in the language of intentional tort,

Beauchamp also contended that Dow "intentionally assaulted" him by
exposing him to agent orange without his knowledge or consent. " The
Michigan Supreme Court remanded Beauchamp's intentional tort claims
for further proceedings.9 5
In Ohio as well, an injured employee may sue in tort when an employer knowingly exposes an employee to conditions "substantially certain" to result in injury. In Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chemicals,96 the Ohio Supreme Court held that when an employer exposes

employees to toxic chemicals that the employer knows with substantial
certainty will cause the employees harm, the exclusive remedy rule no
longer protects the employer from tort liability. 7 As the court stated,
the Ohio Supreme Court stated that it "implicitly" adopted this section in Van Fossen v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, 101, 522 N.E.2d 489, 491 (1988), and in Kunkler
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 135, 139, 522 N.E.2d 477, 481 (1988). See

also Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d at 125 n.1, 522 N.E.2d at 513 n.1
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, comment b (1965)).
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 8A, comment b (1965).
89. Beauchamp at 21-22, 398 N.W.2d at 892 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts, §
8A, comment b (1965)). The first paragraph of the foregoing quotation comes from the restatement and both paragraphs are quoted in Beauchamp.
90. Id. at 25, 398 N.W.2d at 893. Subsequent to Beauchamp, the Michigan Court of
Appeals, in Kachadoorianv. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 168 Mich. App. 273, 424 N.W.2d 34,

(Mich. App. 1988), held that the widow of a steel worker who died of burns because his
foreman allegedly ordered him "to drive his slag-moving machine under [a] vessel containing molten steel" in violation of the corporation's own safety rules and with knowledge that
the vessel frequently overflowed, had raised an issue of whether his death was substantially
certain to occur. Id. at -, 424 N.W.2d at 36-37. The court remanded the case for trial. Id.
at

-,

424 N.W.2d at 36-37.

91.

29 CFR 1910.1000 lists exposure limits for toxic chemicals.

92.
93.
94.

Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 4, 398 N.W.2d at 883.
Id.
Id.

95. Id., at 27, 398 N.W.2d 894.
96. 69 Ohio St. 2d. 608, 433 N.E.2d 572 (1982).
97. Id., at 615-16, 433 N.E.2d at 578.
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"workers' compensation Acts were designed to improve the plight of the
injured worker, and to hold that intentional torts are covered under the
Act would be tantamount to encouraging such [tortious] conduct, and
this clearly cannot be reconciled with the motivating spirit and purpose
of the Act." '
In Jones v. VIP Development Co., 99 the Ohio Supreme Court allowed
three employer tort cases consolidated on appeal to proceed to trial. The
court pointed out that although Ohio law requires a demonstration of employer "intent," "specific intent to injure is not an essential element of an
intentional tort ... [if harm is] substantially certain, [and] not merely
likely, to occur. ' 100 Notably, Montana's exclusive remedy rule likewise
does not explicitly require "specific" or subjective intent. 0 1 The Ohio
court's elucidation of the intent requisite for overcoming the exclusive
remedy bar, thus, offers illumination for Montana's standard as well:
Where a defendant acts despite his knowledge that the risk is appreciable, his conduct is negligent. Where the risk is great, his actions may be
characterized as reckless or wanton, but not intentional. The actor must
know or believe that harm is a substantially certain consequence of his
act before intent to injure will be inferred. 102
Like Ohio's court, Montana's could infer an employer's intent from evidence that substantial certainty of harm to employees will occur.
The facts of the two other Ohio cases-Hamlin v. Snow Metal Products10 3 and Gains v. City of Painesville'" 4-consolidated on appeal from
summary judgment in Jones illustrate how the substantial certainty test
can both relieve courts of difficult subjective standards and yet satisfy the
intent element of exclusive remedy statutes by applying an objective test.
In Jones, two workers were harmed seriously when they came in contact with a high-voltage-electrical-power line.' 5 They alleged that the
employer "knew, or should have known" of the dangerous conditions and
should have warned employees of the danger or made safe the conditions.106 Of the three cases presented on appeal, Jones offered the court
the most difficulty in balancing on the fine wire between negligence and
intent. The court's decision to apply the substantial certainty test and to
remand Jones for trial had a profound and unfortunate impact on the law
in Ohio. 10 Jones' facts, rather than constituting substantial certainty of
98. Id. at 614, 433 N.E.2d at 577 (emphasis added).
99. 15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
100. Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051 (emphasis in original).

§

101.

MONT. CODE ANN.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051 (emphasis added).
15 Ohio St. 3d 90, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 90, 472 N.E.2d at 1048.
Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051-52.
The court's attempt to do justice ultimately led the Ohio legislature to enact se-

39-71-411(1987).

verely restrictive legislation. See Comment, Ohio's Attempt to Circumvent the Concept of
Intentional Tort-Enactment of Revised Code Section 4121.80, 16 CAP. U.L. REv. 279, 289,
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injury or harm, constituted at most gross negligence. Recognizing this in
later cases, the Ohio court subsequently narrowed its holding in Jones to
avoid opening the floodgates of litigation.
In Hamlin, the plaintiffs along with other employees complained of
poor air quality caused by toxic chemicals at defendant Snow Metal
Products' plant.'" 8 When employees complained to the plant supervisor
that exposure to these toxic chemicals was making them ill, the defendant
either "ignored" or "ridiculed" them."0 9 In 1979, when air quality deteriorated further, several employees "broke out in rashes or experienced respiratory problems."" 0 An investigation of the plant showed that acid
fumes had leaked into the ventilation system, but that plant personnel
nonetheless repeatedly assured employees that conditions were safe."'
The plaintiffs subsequently presented evidence showing Snow Products'
awareness of the hazards of working with the chemicals and knowledge of
acid fumes recirculating in the workplace.
The Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that if an employer engages in
conduct "substantially certain" to cause employees harm, a jury may
draw objective inferences to satisfy the intent element of an intentional
tort." 2 Drawing such objective inferences from the Hamlin facts, the
court concluded that Snow Metal Products' conduct "certainly [fell]
within the parameters of intentional wrongdoing, particularly given the
added feature of actively misrepresenting the degree of danger to employees, thereby prolonging their exposure to the risk."" 3 Had the court demanded a showing of the employer's specific or subjective intent, the
Hamlin plaintiffs could not have crossed the exclusive remedy bar.
In Gains, plaintiff and decedent Willie Gains died of injuries he sustained when his arm was drawn into a coal chute by a pulley." 4 Gains' job
was to keep the coal chute free from accumulations of coal dust and coal
fragments."" The defendant employer used a blow torch to remove the
safety guard at the top of the chute, ostensibly to make it easier for Gains
to perform his job."' The Ohio Supreme Court held that the defendant's
removal of the chute's safety guard constituted an intentional tort, be295 (1986) (authored by Donald Nickerson, Jr.) (contending that this statute changed the
meaning of "substantial certainty" to deliberate intent, creating an "unconscionable" burden of proof for the plaintiff). See also Note, S.307: Ohio's New Workers' Compensation
Law-At Least for Now, 12 U. DAYTON L. REV. 489 (1986) (authored by Gary Nasal); Comment, The New Workers' Compensation Law in Ohio: Senate Bill 307 Was No Accident, 20
AKRON L. REV. 491 (1987); Hertlein, Intentional Torts by Employers in Ohio, the General
Assembly's Solution: Ohio Revised Code Section 4121.80, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 247 (1987).
108. Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 92, 472 N.E.2d at 1049.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 95, 472 N.E.2d at 1051 (emphasis in original).
113. Id. at 97, 472 N.E. 2d at 1053.
114. Id. at 91, 472 N.E.2d at 1048.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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cause the guard was intended to protect the plaintiff from "exactly the
kind of injury ... the decedent suffered, . . . the degree of risk posed to
employees by the removal of the cover was extremely high, and . . .no

warnings were issued to employees concerning this risk.""' The court explained that:
A defendant who fails to warn of a known defect or hazard which poses a
grave threat of injury may reasonably be considered to have acted despite a belief that harm is substantially certain to occur. The evidence..
•supports a finding that the defendant employer knew the removal of
the cover posed a substantial risk to its employees." 8

The court, following its earlier holding in Blankenship, held that when
the evidence shows that the employer was "substantially certain" that an
injury would occur, the injured employee can maintain a tort action for
such injury."'
In moving toward a clearer expression of the substantial certainty
test, however, the Ohio Supreme Court created an anomalous result. The
Jones case in which two workers sustained injuries when they came in
contact with high-voltage-power lines arguably constituted gross negligence "' rather than an intentional tort. Therefore, first the court, and
then the Ohio legislature, acted to limit the scope of Jones.'2 ' Critics of
the decision in Jones included Michigan's Beauchamp court, which reasoned that Jones extended the substantial certainty test to include the
high probability or "substantial likelihood" of harm. 2 Attempting to
117. Id. at 96, 472 N.E.2d at 1052.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 96, 97, 98, 472 N.E.2d at 1052, 1054.
120. See Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, 122, 522 N.E. 2d
489, 509 (1988) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Jones, the majority concluded that under certain circumstances, the deliberate neglect of a known hazardous condition could constitute
substantial certainty of harm. Stating that "reasonable minds could differ as to whether the
defendant's conduct was intentional," the Jones court remanded the case for trial. Jones, 15

Ohio St. 3d at 96, 472 N.E.2d at 1052.
121. See Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489
(1988); Pariseau v. Wedge Products, Inc., 36 Ohio St. 3d 124, 522 N.E.2d 511 (1988); and
Kunkler v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 36 Ohio St. 3d 135, 522 N.E.2d 477 (1988).
After Blankenship and Jones, the Ohio General Assembly passed OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4121.80 (Page's 1988). OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Page's 1988) defines intentional tort as "an act committed with the intent to injure another or committed with the
belief that the injury is substantially certain to occur." OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
4121.80(G)(1) (Page's 1988) states that substantial certainty "means that an employer acts
with deliberate intent to cause an employee to suffer injury, disease, condition, or death."
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Page's 1988) (emphasis added).
Two apparent exceptions exist to this deliberate intent-to-injure requirement under the
statute and stop it short of a complete retreat to the true intentional tort standard:
Deliberate removal by the employer of an equipment safety guard or deliberate misrepresentation of a toxic or hazardous substance is evidence, the presumption of which may be rebutted, of an act committed with the intent to injure another if injury or an occupational disease or condition occurs as a direct result.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4121.80(G)(1) (Page's 1988).
122. Beauchamp, 427 Mich. at 19 & n.55, 398 N.W.2d at 891 & n.55. Ohio's Justice
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limit the effect of the Jones decision and to fashion a workable substantial certainty test, the Ohio court honed its test in three 1988 cases.
In Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co,' 23 an employee sustained
injuries when backing down steps welded onto a machine. No one else
had ever had problems with the steps." 4 Nor had a safety inspector ap25
parently ever cited the employer for safety violations related to them.1
Correctly holding that Van Fossen's injuries were not substantially certain to occur, 2 ' the Ohio Supreme Court explained that the substantial
certainty test for intentional torts describes conduct that is "somewhat
less than the deliberate assault on an employee by an employer, but more
than the grossly negligent or reckless act of an employer which occasions
an injury to the employee."' 27 In addition, the majority outlined a threepart test to infer employer intent. That objective test of intent requires:
(1) knowledge by the employer of the existence of a dangerous process,
procedure, instrumentality or condition within his [or her] business operation; (2) knowledge by the employer that if employees are required by
virtue of their employment to be subjected to such dangerous process,
procedure, instrumentality or condition, then harm to them would be a
substantial certainty, and not just a high risk; (3) that the employer,
under such circumstances, and with such knowledge, did act to so require the employee to continue performing his [or her] employment
tasks." 8
In Pariseauv. Wedge Products, Inc.,'2 9 the first Ohio case with a full
trial record to come up on appeal after Van Fossen, the majority cravenly
decided that an incident in which a defective punch press amputated
three fingers on an employee's right hand" 30 amounted to gross negligence
instead of an intentional tort."'1 In a concurring opinion, Justice Holmes
did, however, provide a useful analysis of the three-part Van Fossen test
3
in applying it to the facts in Pariseau.11
Two sub-elements compose the first key concept of the Van Fossen
test: 1) whether a "dangerous process, procedure, instrumentality or condition [existed] within [an employer's] business operation" and 2)
whether the "employer knew of it.""' The trial record in Pariseau included "considerable testimony, set forth in nearly absolute terms," that
the press in question "was known to 'repeat' its cycle" unexpectedly so
Douglas stated in his dissent in Van Fossen that the Jones facts constituted negligence, not
substantial certainty of harm. Van Fossen, 36 Ohio St. 3d at 122, 522 N.E.2d at 509.
123. 36 Ohio St. 3d 100, 522 N.E.2d 489 (1988).
124. Id. at 118, 522 N.E.2d at 505.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 114-15, 522 N.E.2d at 502 (emphasis added).
128. Id. at 116, 522 N.E.2d at 504 (emphasis added).
129. 36 Ohio St. 3d 124, 522 N.E.2d 511 (1988).
130. Id. at 124, 522 N.E.2d at 512.
131. Id. at 129, 522 N.E.2d at 516.
132. Id. at 129-32, 522 N.E.2d 516-19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 130, 522 N.E.2d at 517 (Holmes, J., concurring).
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that the press might come down unpredictably and injure an operator's
hand.' 3 A former Wedge Products' maintenance superintendent testified
that he had told both the plant manager and owner that the press's
brakes were defective and unsafe and allowed the press to repeat.' 3 The
same press previously had also amputated another employee's three fingers,' 6 because of such failure. Moreover, a pullback-safety device on the
press would have prevented Mark Pariseau's injury, but Wedge Products'
foreman failed to properly adjust it.' 37 Operating the press under such
conditons was like playing Russian roulette. Moreover, Wedge Products
had knowledge of this dangerous condition, fulfilling the second sub-element of the first part of the Van Fossen test.
Both the Pariseaumajority and the dissents apparently agreed that a
jury could conclude that these facts met part three of the test, that the
employer "did act to require the employee to continue to perform the
dangerous task."' 38 As one justice stated, despite employees' "continued
complaints ... that the press was repeating, the prior injury to ... [the
other employee] on the same press, the numerous warnings from [Wedge
Product's] maintenance superintendent and the knowledge of the
problems by management, including the owner of the company, no
changes were made to the press."' 3 9 Furthermore, on the very "night of
[Pariseau's] injury" the press repeated twice when another employee was
operating it.'4 ° When that employee reported this information to the foreman and "refused to operate the press any longer," the foreman-over
the other employee's objections-assigned Pariseau, who had worked at
the plant only three weeks, to operate the press.' 4 Although other employees used a piece of wood to remove the finished product, because they
feared the press would repeat on them and amputate fingers, when Pariseau asked what the wood was for, the foreman tossed "the wood aside,
telling [Pariseaul he would not need it."'"" The record also showed that
the foreman "knew that another employee had lost the fingers on his
134. Id. "A former maintenance specialist testified that he informed the management
orally and in writing that the machine repeated, and therefore jeopardized the hands of the
operator. He recommended that particular safety systems be installed, which was not done."

Id.
135. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 520 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 130, 522 N.E.2d at 517 (Holmes, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 133, 522 N.E.2d at 519 (Locher, J., dissenting). The employer stated that
the reason for the accident was the shearing off of a bolt on the press, but two employees
that
testified that after the accident, the foreman "sent them away from the machine ....
they observed him . . . beating on it with something metallic . . . [, and] that afterward he
emerged from the area with a broken bolt, asserting that its failure had . . . [caused] the
injuries." Id. at 131, 522 N.E.2d at 517 (Holmes, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 130, 522 N.E.2d at 517 (Holmes, J., concurring) (quoting Van Fossen, 36
Ohio St. 3d at 101, 522 N.E.2d at 491).
139. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 520 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 520-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 134, 522 N.E.2d at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 135, 522 N.E.2d at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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right hand in 1976" while operating the press.143 Thus, the jury concluded
from this evidence that Wedge Products, through its agent foreman, required Pariseau "to continue to perform the dangerous task"144 despite
substantial certainty of injury, thus, satisfying part three of the test.
However, while the court concluded that the Pariseaufacts met parts
one and three of the Van Fossen test, it divided over part two of the
test-whether the employer knew the injury was substantially certain to
occur. 14 5 The majority apparently viewed Pariseau's injury as a statistical
likelihood. The minority, on the other hand, viewed his injury as substantially certain to occur, but that its specific time of occurrence was yet
unknown. While courts following the minority rule continue to struggle
with this aspect of substantial certainty, they generally hold that an injury, disease, or death is substantially certain to occur when: 1) an employee complains to an employer about defective equipment or toxic substances, or the employer has actual knowledge of the dangerous condition,
2) the employer knows that the equipment or substances have previously
injured other employees, and 3) the employer still refuses to fix the machine or condition. Upon evidence of these three factors, a jury may find
that an injury, disease, or death was substantially certain to occur.
Notwithstanding overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Pariseau court held that Pariseau's accident was not substantially certain to
occur. The majority apparently determined that the cause of Pariseau's
injury was different from the other employee's and was, thus, not substantially certain to occur.146 The majority also apparently believed that
statistical likelihood of harm-regardless of how high-does not constitute substantial certainty of occurrence. Therefore, the majority concluded that it could not infer as a matter of law "that [the foreman]
knew, to a substantial certainty, that what he was doing would injure this
employee. 1' 47 Implied in the majority's holding is that because the press
did not fail every time, injury to an operator was not a substantial certainty. The question, therefore, remains: How defective must a machine
be before an employer is substantially certain that the machine will cause
an injury?
Pariseau's majority decision allows the employer to play Russian
roulette with employee safety. Placing an employee in front of a known
defective press that will repeat at a time uncertain is just like placing a
revolver loaded with just one bullet at an employee's temple and then
telling him or her to pull the trigger until the end of a shift. If the only
question outstanding is exactly when defective equipment will cause
harm, that harm is nonetheless substantially certain to occur. As dissenting Justice Douglas observed, a jury, two out of three court of appeals
143. Id.
144. Id. at 130, N.E.2d at 517 (Holmes, J., concurring).
145. Id. at 128-29, 522 N.E.2d at 515-16 (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 132, 522 N.E.2d at 519 (Holmes, J., concurring).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol50/iss2/9

22

r: Tort Liability for Employers Who Create Workplace Conditions "Substantially Certain" to Cause Injury or

TORT LIABILITY FOR EMPLOYERS

19891

judges, and three out of seven Ohio Supreme Court justices agreed that
Pariseau's evidence met the requirements of an injury substantially certain to occur.14 s Indeed, the evidence "fit[] perfectly" 49 the three-part
50
test outlined in Van Fossen.1
In his interpretation of the majority's conclusion, Justice Holmes
lapsed into the refuted "true intentional tort" test for intent, stating the
employer must specifically intend to "injure this employee.' 5 ' At least
part of the majority's conclusion, then, hinged less on an analysis of the
evidence than on an impulse to revert to Ohio's former use of a subjective
test of intent. The Jones court had explicitly stated that "specific intent
to injure" was not an "essential element" of intent under the substantial
certainty definition. 152 Therefore, as Justice Douglas correctly noted, the
verdict should not have been "so lightly set aside,"1' 5 as Pariseau's injury
was one substantially certain to occur.
Pariseau ran the press until "on the very last piece, as he reached in
to catch the falling part, the press repeated and his hand, his livelihood
and his very life were smashed.' 54 With the Pariseau holding, the Ohio
Supreme Court also smashed its prior progressive use of objective intent
in measuring whether an injury is substantially certain to occur. Nonetheless, the objective test elucidated in Van Fossen remains viable and is the
clearest statement defining substantial certainty yet articulated from a
minority jurisdiction.
IV.

MONTANA AND THE "SUBSTANTIAL

CERTAINTY" TEST

As the dissents impliedly recommended in Noonan, 55 Montana
should adopt the substantial certainty test, allowing a jury to infer an
employer's intent when the employer knew or should have known the injury was substantially certain to occur. As Justices Sheehy15 and Hunt 57
both pointed out in their well-reasoned dissents in Noonan, the law does
not require an injured employee to show that the employer "maliciously
and specifically directed" his actions against the employee personally.' 58
The unsafe workplace in Noonan had "existed over a protracted period of
time," with the employer's "full knowledge," and despite employees' com148. Id. at 135, 522 N.E.2d at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 132, 522 N.E.2d at 519 (Holmes, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
152. Jones, 15 Ohio St. 3d at 95, 472 N.E.2d 1051.
153. Pariseau,36 Ohio St. 3d at 135, 522 N.E.2d at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154. Id.
155. 216 Mont. at 226, 230, 700 P.2d at 626, 628 (Sheehy, J., dissenting) (Hunt,
J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 226, 700 P.2d at 626 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 230, 700 P.2d at 628 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 227, 230, 700 P.2d at 625, 629 (quoting Great Western Sugar Co., 188
Mont.
at 7, 610 P.2d at
(Sheehy,ofJ.,
dissenting)
(Hunt, J., dissenting).
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plaints about the broken planer.' 9 As Justice Hunt observed, "Such conduct, 'specifically directs the harm at each and every employee.' "160
Thus, for employers to face tort liability, they need not have a "specific
intent" to harm a specific employee. ' An employer's wanton disregard of
workplace safety itself objectively manifests the employer's intent to
harm employees.
Rejecting the majority's application of a subjective intent standard,
Justice Hunt stated that an employer's conduct need not "go so far as...
[an] ...assault" to constitute an intentional tort.'6 2 Spring Creek's egregious safety violations and requirement that employees work under such
conditions or forfeit a portion of their salaries constituted a willful disre''
gard of the welfare of "each and every [Spring Creek] employee.""3
Therefore, Spring Creek's conscious disregard for safety did not have to
be directed specifically at Randal Noonan to constitute objective intent
sufficient to meet substantial certainty.'"
Justice Sheehy summed up the key distinction between the subjective and objective tests for intent in his dissent:
It should be axiomatic that the proof of malicious and specifically
directed harm can be inferred from the facts and circumstances surrounding the occurrence. If that be not true, the only possible way for an
employee to recover for an intentionally-caused injury from an employer
would be the direct admission of the employer that he did in fact so
willfully intend [such harm].16'
Noting that the Montana Supreme Court has no difficulty in inferring
criminal intent from the facts and circumstances in criminal cases, Justice Sheehy concluded: "What beguiling charm of intellect allows inferences to establish malicious intent in criminal cases, in fraudulent conveyances cases, [and in intentional tort cases outside of workers'
compensation], but not in a case where a man's left arm is literally ripped
66
to pieces?'
CONCLUSION

The Montana Supreme Court should allow injured employees to
maintain a civil action in intentional tort when an employer's conduct
creates conditions substantially certain to harm them. Absent a federal
commitment to OSHA protections, employee torts are the only way truly
to discourage employers from allowing dangerous workplaces to exist in
wanton disregard of their employees' safety.
159.

Id. at 230, 700.P.2d 629 (Hunt, J., dissenting).

160. Id. (emphasis added).
161. Id. at 231, 700 P.2d at 629 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 230-31, 700 P.2d at 629 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
163.
164.

Id. at 230, 700 P.2d at 629 (Hunt, J., dissenting).
Id.

165. Id. at 227-28, 700 P.2d at 627 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 228, 700 P.2d at 627 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
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Although some lobbies will undoubtedly complain that subjecting
employers to the threat of tort suits for maintaining an unsafe workplace
would make them uncompetitive with other employers, an unsafe workplace is more costly in the long run in increased workers' compensation
claims and reduced productivity. Factories or plants that continually injure workers cannot compete with plants that choose the route of safety
and continuous production. Indeed, the only way an unsafe plant can
compete is through a timid court's subsidizing the operation by failing to
hold the tortious employer liable.
Ohio's dissenting justices attacked adoption of the substantial certainty test on the same basis, that goods manufactured in Ohio would
"suffer a competitive disadvantage," for example, and that the test would
create a "less hospitable climate... to attract and maintain industry ...
,,117 However, as Ohio Supreme Court Justice Brown stated:
This is a scare tactic to create an illusion that industry will leave ... and
establish itself in other states ... [which] grant immunity to employers
who intentionally harm their employees....
The view expressed to support employer immunity is generated by
greed to save a few dollars at the expense of [injured or] chemically
poisoned employees. It displays a brutal lack of compassion. It sends a
message that dollars saved is more important than workers' lives. 8
Montana should convey the message that workers' lives and safety are
more important than dollars saved and that an employer who creates or
ignores conditions substantially certain to result in injury or death faces
the threat of tort liability. As Justice Brown concluded, "[d]ire predictions of excessive litigation and substantial liability always accompany
any important decision .... "169 The Montana Supreme Court should resist such scare tactics and recommit the law to worker safety.

167. Blankenship, 69 Ohio St. 2d. at 624, 433 N.E.2d at 583 (Krupansky,
J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 619-20, 433 N.E.2d at 580 (Brown, J., concurring).
169. Id. at 620, 433 N.E.2d at 580 (Brown, J., concurring) (quoting LeCrone v. Ohio
Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 138, 201 N.E.2d 533, 540 (1963)).
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